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Adverse Selection in Insurance Contracting

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Academic year: 2021

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Figure

Figure 1 : Monopoly model
Figure 2 : Graphical representation of  E d D ( ) x + δ N d ( ) t
Figure 3 : One-period competitive contracts with full information
Figure 4a : Inexistence of a Rothschild-Stiglitz pooling equilibrium
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